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Abstract 
We argue that an important contributing factor into market inefficiency 
is the lack of a robust mechanism for the stock price to rise if a company 
has good earnings, e.g., via buybacks/dividends. Instead, the stock price 
is prone to volatility due to rather random perception/interpretation of 
earnings announcements (among other data) by market participants. 
We present empirical evidence indicating that dividend paying stocks on 
average are less volatile, even factoring out market cap. We further 
ponder possible ways of increasing market efficiency via 1) instituting 
such a mechanism, 2) a taxation scheme that would depend on holding 
periods, and 3) a universal crossing engine/exchange for mutual and 
pension funds (and similar long holding horizon vehicles) with no dark 
pools, 100% transparency, and no advantage for timing orders. 
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According to the SEC (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission) website,
3
 “A Ponzi scheme is 
an investment fraud that involves the payment of purported returns to existing investors from 
funds contributed by new investors.” SEC further clarifies: “With little or no legitimate earnings, 
Ponzi schemes require a consistent flow of money from new investors to continue. Ponzi 
schemes tend to collapse when it becomes difficult to recruit new investors or when a large 
number of investors ask to cash out.” So, is the stock market a Ponzi scheme? (See Gross 
[2012].) As we will argue below, the truth appears to have various shades of grey…  
 Ultimately, our goal here is to ponder the origins of alpha. Why does alpha exist? Where 
does it come from? The stock market is man-made, with all its complex, artificial and not always 
rational rules and regulations. Unlike, say, the planetary motion in our solar system, which is 
governed by the fundamental laws of physics (to wit, gravity), the stock market is messier. It is 
not directly governed by the fundamental laws of nature.
4
 This lack of underlying fundamental 
description makes the origins of alpha murkier. But not all is lost. Let us start by asking:  
Why does anyone invest in stocks?  
“Greed!” some would proclaim. More moderately, the idea is simple. You buy a stock and hope 
its price goes up, so at some point you can sell it at a profit. But what is this “hope” based on? 
The stock
5
 price – at least in free market – is determined by supply and demand. If the company 
that issued the stock has substantial earnings and accumulates extra cash on its books, then it 
can buy back its own stock and drive the price up. However, there is no law, rule or regulation 
that would require any company to buy back its own stock or pay dividends
6
 – another way of 
rewarding its shareholders – if it has good earnings or excess cash. The decision to buy back the 
stock or issue dividend is in the sole discretion of the company’s board of directors and does 
not require the shareholders’ approval. On paper, shareholders have voting power and can – in 
theory – replace the board of directors if they are unhappy with it. However, in practice only 
large shareholders have such power. Small (including most individual) shareholders are 
effectively disenfranchised in this regard, with no guarantee of stock buybacks or dividends. 
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 With no such guarantees, the aforementioned “hope” that the stock price will rise is 
based on the expectation that, if the company has good earnings, other investors will want to 
purchase its stock. However, again, with no such guarantees, naturally, one may ask:     
Why do earnings affect the stock price?  
The evident answer is that the market movers and shakers base their decisions on the earnings, 
and then the majority of the rest of the market participants follow the suit. And the reason why 
the former look at the earnings is that a subset of companies – typically these are established 
companies with solid track records – follow unwritten rules of rewarding their shareholders via 
buybacks and/or dividends when their earnings are good. Many of these companies have large 
shareholders – these are some of the aforementioned movers and shakers, including those that 
have been grandfathered down – so for such companies it makes perfect sense to reward 
shareholders with buybacks and dividends. However, many – in fact, most – companies have no 
intention of following the aforementioned unwritten rules. They do not have solid track records 
and their stock prices follow the earnings only if – and to the extent that – most market 
participants extrapolate basing their decision-making on earnings to such less established 
companies from the way they treat the established companies that actually follow the 
unwritten rules. So, in a way, most companies then would appear to be “free-riding”.  
 The lack of a guaranteed mechanism for the shareholders being rewarded by the 
companies themselves has undesirable consequences. Thus, it makes it tempting for companies 
to cook their books and exaggerate their earnings, which drive the stock prices. If a company 
was required to buy back its own stock and/or issue dividend when its earnings are good, it 
would have much less incentive to exaggerate its earnings – had such a requirement existed, 
the dishonest accounting practices during the dotcom era, when many companies had no 
intention to play by the unwritten rules and instead aimed at making a quick buck at the 
shareholders’ expense, likely would not have been as widespread. Also, since only a fraction of 
the companies follows the unwritten rules, bubbles are likely unavoidable as investments in the 
rest of the market are based on the hope that the corresponding stock prices will rise due to 
more money being pumped into such stocks by new investments, not via, say, buybacks. If it 
were not for the aforementioned established companies, it would be a (quasi) Ponzi scheme.  
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Where does alpha come from?  
The above discussion helps – we hope – shed light on the origins of alpha. With everything else 
being equal, the market likely would be more efficient if all companies followed the unwritten 
rules – or if they were required to reward their shareholders by systematically increasing the 
stock price via, say, buybacks with a formulaic relation between the required buybacks and 
earnings (among other details). As it stands, the supply and demand is driven by what appears 
to be a rather random perception/interpretation of the earnings announcements (among other 
information) by market participants. This leads to volatility and mispricings at various time 
horizons. These mispricings are then arbitraged away by what can be generically termed as 
“mean-reversion” (or “contrarian”) strategies. For a given “mean-reversion” time horizon there 
might also exist opportunities to profit via what can be generically termed as “momentum” 
strategies on accordingly shorter (and, in some cases, longer) time horizons.  
 One important ingredient that is implicitly assumed in the above discussion is market 
impact and executions. Even if every company under the Sun followed the unwritten rules, due 
to a large number of market players and virtual impossibility to predict supply and demand 
imbalances or their precise timings, mispricings and inefficiencies are inevitable. Longer horizon 
strategies thereby create arbitrage opportunities on somewhat shorter horizons; strategies on 
such scales create arbitrage opportunities on yet shorter time scales; and so on – all the way 
down to HFT (high frequency trading) strategies. While on the longest horizon time scales the 
strategies are mostly long (mutual and pension funds, holding companies, etc.), on shorter 
horizons strategies can be dollar neutral, hence seemingly creating profit “out of thin air” – 
which does not take into account substantial monetary and human capital involved. 
More market efficiency, less alpha?  
Along with transactions costs, dollar neutral and, more generally, proprietary strategies
7
 that 
operate on shorter scales make the stock market deviate from a “zero-sum” game between 
passive and active investments strategies – if such investments are restricted to long-only 
strategies, that is. Both passive and active investment strategies “feed” those who profit from 
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transaction costs as well as proprietary strategies. Once the latter are taken into account, it is 
indeed a “zero-sum” game.
8
 However, the money does not appear out of thin air, the profits 
made, say, by proprietary strategies ultimately come from the mutual and pension funds and 
other long-only investments, including retail traders. A mom-and-pop/grandma-and-grandpa 
investor advocate may wonder, what – if anything – can be done to keep that money from 
trickling down. It appears that there are some ways of achieving this, albeit they may not find 
enthusiastic support among various groups with vested interests in the subject. Here is a list: 
1. If companies are required to do buybacks and/or issue dividends in a simple formulaic 
fashion when their earnings are good – e.g., proportionately to their earnings above 
some threshold – this would likely reduce volatility and arbitrage opportunities in the 
market. It would also likely reduce the companies’ desire to cook their books. 
2. If there is a progressive tax on trading profits – the shorter the holding period, the 
higher the tax – this would likely make HFT and similar proprietary trading much less 
appealing. Naturally, imposing such progressive taxes would be politically challenging.
9
 
3. A universal crossing engine/exchange with no dark pools, 100% transparency, and no 
advantage for timing orders, would likely dramatically reduce transaction costs for large 
mutual and pension funds and similar vehicles. Ultimately, it would also likely reduce 
arbitrage opportunities on shorter time horizon scales by reducing volatility.
10
 Likely, 
this would substantially weaken the argument that proprietary strategies are a necessity 
for they provide liquidity, price discovery and make the market more efficient.  
The ideas listed above may not be all-around popular or perfect. They are not intended as such. 
Hopefully, they are thought provoking. After all, what is the key idea behind the stock market? 
Arguably, it is for companies to raise money – in some sense, it is a form of crowdfunding but 
with a hope of a profit – to invest into their businesses, create new products and services, make 
life better for everyone and grow the economy. Then the question is how to structure the stock 
market in a way that would make it work most efficiently, albeit imperfectly, for this noble goal. 
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What about empirical evidence?  
Since there is no law, rule or regulation that would require any company to buy back its own 
stock or pay dividends, direct empirical measurements of the effects of such a requirement on 
alphas or existence thereof is not an option. However, not all is lost. We can design a test to 
see, e.g., if there is a correlation between (not) paying dividends and the “extent” of alpha 
(arbitrage) opportunities a stock creates. However, first we must quantify what this “extent” 
entails. 
In this regard, it is important to note that we are not interested in the stock 
performance (or drift in the stochastic language). Instead, we are interested in the stock 
volatility, i.e., we wish to see whether there is a correlation between (not) paying dividends and 
the stock volatility. Here some care is needed as the logarithmic stock volatility is strongly anti-
correlated with the logarithmic market cap, and there is a strong correlation between paying 
dividends and logarithmic market cap as well. Therefore, we run a cross-sectional regression of 
the logarithmic historical stock return volatility over a 2-column matrix (plus the intercept). The 
first column is binary: its element equals 1 if the corresponding stock pays dividends pursuant 
to the definition below; otherwise, it is 0. The second column is populated by log of the market 
cap for each stock. The stock returns, for which the historical volatility is computed, are the 
overnight (previous close to open) returns – we have taken such a short time horizon 
deliberately, to wit, to ensure that the time horizons for the returns (overnight) and the 
dividends (quarterly) are as uncorrelated as possible. We take the daily overnight returns for 
the 4-year period 9/2/2010-9/4/2014, inclusive (1008 trading days, to be precise). We take 
market cap as of 9/1/2010.
11
 The stock is considered to pay dividends if it has paid at least 16 
nonzero dividends during the period 6/1/2010-12/1/2014, i.e., we “pad” the aforementioned 4-
year period by about a quarter on each end (to avoid missing the dividends that were paid just 
before or right after the 4-year period) and require that the number of paid dividends be one 
per quarter. The universe of stocks we take for our test consists of the U.S. listed common 
stocks and class shares (no OTCs, preferred shares, etc.) which have pricing data on 
                                                           
11
 Taking market cap out-of-sample (as we have done) or (partially) in-sample has only a small effect on the results.  
7 
 
http://finance.yahoo.com as of (and accessed on) 9/6/2014.
12
 The dividend and market cap 
data is also available from the same source. For comparison purposes we also run the same 
regression by requiring 1 to 10 nonzero dividends in the above definition. The results are given 
in Table 1.   
 
Coefficients Estimate Standard 
Error 
t-value:16+ 
dividends 
t-value:1-10 
dividends 
Intercept -3.753 0.1245 -30.16 -21.54 
Dividends (binary) -0.714 0.0268 -26.66 3.728 
Market Cap -0.232 0.0063 -36.67  -45.26      
 
Table 1. The regression coefficients (estimates), standard errors and t-values for the regression 
of the logarithmic historical volatility over the binary dividends (1 if at least 16 dividends are 
paid, and 0 otherwise – see above) and log of the market cap (plus the intercept). The total 
number of stocks is 3422. The number of stocks with 16+ (1-10) dividends is 1266 (588); the F-
statistic is 2306 (1043); the multiple and adjusted R-squared are 0.4027 (0.3789) and 0.4025 
(0.3786). 
 
Our test results indicate a strong negative correlation between log of the stock volatility and 
whether the stock pays dividends, i.e., dividend paying stocks on average are less volatile. A 
similar analysis for buybacks requires buyback announcements (both dates and sizes),
13
 which 
is not freely available data, and it is outside of the scope of this note. We hope to perform such 
analysis in the future. 
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